Russian disinformation campaign targets German local elections
Russian disinformation campaigns are increasingly targeting candidates for regional and municipal government positions in Germany ahead of crucial local elections scheduled for September.
The eastern states of Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin are going to the polls next month, and the pro-Russian far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is expected to do well there. But German authorities warn that Moscow is not just counting on genuine pro-Russian sentiment among some voters in eastern Germany.
Instead, it is actively seeking to exacerbate existing political and social divisions. For example, officials have uncovered videos that resemble reputable media outlets — with their logos copied — and falsely accuse politicians of serious sexual crimes.
They have targeted candidates from all major parties in regions where elections are due to be held soon, with two notable exceptions: the pro-Russian far-right AfD and the left-wing BSW.
In addition to Russian intelligence services and organizations such as the Agency for Social Design (ASD), an IT agency with close ties to the Kremlin, academics, including those affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences, are believed to be playing an increasingly important role in Moscow’s information operations.
Organizations such as ASD, which is funded by the Russian state and receives support and strategic direction from Unit No. 29155 of the Russian military intelligence service, have developed relatively detailed key performance indicators.
However, the definition of success at ASD appears to be quite broad, as the agency reportedly considers almost any media coverage of its operations a victory, regardless of whether it ultimately contributes to Russia’s influence goals.
The ASD’s ambitions are given by internal documents of the organization, obtained by Euractiv through a recent leak and recognized as authentic by the Berlin authorities.
The documents state that the organization aims to increase “the effectiveness of support for foreign policy measures implemented by the state to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”
This goal is planned to be achieved primarily by “deepening internal divisions within the ruling elites, stimulating protest activity among opposition forces, escalating anti-government demonstrations, and destabilizing the politically apathetic part of the electorate in NATO countries and their satellite states.”
The organization also claims that its influence model has already been “tested, proven, and recognized as reliable” and can be applied on major online platforms, in different countries and thematic areas.
For example, the ASD identifies “mass protests in NATO countries — with the subsequent dissemination of relevant content in the adversary’s media space — as a key supporting element.”
German authorities have uncovered several projects that appear to be part of the ASD’s strategy. One is a Wikipedia clone, some of whose pages are reportedly already ahead of the original site in certain search results.
Another document outlines plans to set up a think tank in 2026, whose experts could appear in Western media outlets, promoting narratives that align with Russian interests. The website is reportedly up and running, with an English version.
“Once this work is complete, similar sites in German, French and Spanish will be launched. Social media accounts (Facebook and X) will also be created,” the document says.
Germany, as the biggest supporter of Ukraine, is seen as a prime target for the Russian disinformation ecosystem.
However, one ASD document outlines plans to monitor “the accounts of the 100 most prominent French opposition opinion leaders.” It states that the site will publish “30-40 of their messages daily, including screenshots and links to the original posts,” and will also launch a French-language “AI News” project with hundreds of videos.