Lukashenko is trying to navigate between the drops
Lukashenko’s regime is creating the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel. It will include airborne, artillery, anti-aircraft, and reconnaissance units.
Why does Lukashenko’s regime need a significant strengthening of the Special Operations Forces? Who is the dictator preparing to attack?
For comment, Charter97.org contacted military expert and co-director of the foreign policy and international security programs at the Razumkov Center in Kyiv, Oleksiy Melnyk:
— Lukashenko has recently been actively using rhetoric about allegedly being attacked. Generally speaking, this is nothing new. Any aggressor always claims that they are forced to defend themselves.
In this case, if we talk about Belarus as a potential source of aggression, I think that would be a significant exaggeration. Until the end of March 2022, Lukashenko may have had some plans to jump on this train, the last car of the winner. When Russia invaded Ukraine, including from Belarus, he may have considered joining the winner, as he saw Putin at the time.
But at the end of March 2022, the Russians were forced to retreat from Kyiv. Since then, in my opinion, Lukashenko has been quite successfully trying to navigate between the drops: not offending Putin, not angering him too much, but at the same time not entering this war.
Therefore, if we try to understand why this brigade is being created, it is most likely being done for the same purpose: to show Putin that Lukashenko is also trying to build up his military power. But it is absolutely certain that Lukashenko has no intention of taking any action against Ukraine.
Even if we assume that Lukashenko genuinely fears a threat from Ukraine and is concerned about additional border security, it is difficult to say. In this case, it’s not so much an assessment of a potential adversary’s strategic plans, their potential, and other objective factors, but rather a matter of perception. And perception, as we know, is formed in the mind of a political leader or military commander and is not necessarily based on objective data.
— Near Gomel, there’s a military airfield called Zyabrovka, which came under the control of the Russian military and was used to deploy equipment and launch missiles into Ukraine. Does this mean that the new brigade is being created to serve the Russian army and will effectively become part of it?
— If we consider the scenario of a new invasion from Belarus into the Chernihiv region, targeting Kyiv, which is currently being discussed, then yes, such a possibility is possible.
Russia hasn’t directly used Belarusian territory for aggression against Ukraine for quite some time, except for relay stations and flights of “shahids” through Belarusian territory. Neither missile launches nor Russian aircraft have been based there for quite some time.
Why might the brigade be stationed near the airfield? As a rule, permanent deployment points for mobile brigades are established either at or near airfields. The very word “mobility” implies that transport aircraft must be located within a short distance. Furthermore, creating a brigade from scratch means incurring additional costs. Most likely, the necessary infrastructure already exists there. Therefore, I believe these factors should be considered here: the availability of infrastructure and the connection to mobility.
— Indeed, as you mentioned, Ukrainian intelligence is suggesting that Russia may attempt an invasion of the Chernihiv region. Could the creation of a new brigade near Gomel be connected to these plans?
— According to our intelligence and independent analysts, who can be trusted and who are not trying to hype this issue, there is currently no activity indicating the possibility of such an invasion in the near future.
A certain danger certainly exists. We have had the unfortunate experience of Belarusian territory being used for attack. But no group that would pose a significant threat to Ukraine and be capable of carrying out a large-scale invasion has yet been detected there.
The second point is that Ukraine hasn’t been idle all this time either. Such a threat, even if it’s less pressing now, still exists. Therefore, if such an attempt is made, it won’t be a repeat of 2022, when it was possible to safely enter Ukrainian territory via highways and border crossings.
— What kind of response can Ukraine expect in connection with the appearance of a new assault brigade on its border?
—It’s hard to say. I don’t have access to classified information. In purely theoretical terms, it’s clear that the Ukrainian Armed Forces need to establish some additional reserves. However, if military intelligence and our operatives conclude that the creation of this brigade doesn’t significantly alter the balance of power either now or in the coming months, then no further action may be necessary. Perhaps the forces already covering the border, as well as existing engineering fortifications, will be sufficient to avoid the need to transfer scarce reserves of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from other, more important areas.
It’s also important to understand that the creation of even a single unit, let alone a large troop formation, requires a considerable amount of time before it acquires operational capabilities. Simply recruiting people, forming them into formation, and reporting back: here are the personnel, here are the tanks, here’s a brigade—that’s a very simplistic approach.
The recruited personnel, unless we’re talking about transferring troops from other units, will also need to be trained. They must undergo combat coordination in platoons, companies, and battalions, and also conduct several unit-level exercises. Under normal conditions, this process takes approximately one year. Until then, the new brigade’s level will be equivalent to that of a unit with no combat experience.