
After the mass expulsion of its agents from Western countries, Russian military intelligence has significantly intensified its activities in Japan. Tokyo has become one of the key centers through which the Kremlin receives high-tech components for weapons production.
Journalists for The New York Times have established that the operation is being led by a secret GRU unit operating under the cover of the state airline Aeroflot.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/12/world/asia/russia-spies-japan-war-drones-electronics.html
What is known about the work of the GRU spy network?
According to current and former representatives of five Western intelligence agencies, this unit specializes in finding, purchasing or stealing high-tech dual-use equipment needed by the Russian defense industry.
The department’s employees work under the cover of diplomatic missions or commercial structures. One of these coverts was the office of the Russian state airline Aeroflot, located in the Tokyo skyscraper Toranomon Kotohira Tower. It is from there that the procurement and export of technology to Russia are coordinated.
Journalists name the person who controls the activities of the Russian network in Japan. This is Maxim Vladimirovich Filchenkov, whom Western intelligence agencies identify as a GRU personnel officer.
He arrived in Japan in February 2024, officially working as an employee of Aeroflot. According to intelligence, Filchenkov already had previous experience working in Japan and knew the local high-tech market well. It was after his return that the Russian network began to actively build new logistics channels for the delivery of equipment.
According to Ukrainian estimates, up to 90% of Russian missiles and drones contain Japanese electronic components.
After one of the massive strikes on Kyiv in May 2026, Ukrainian investigators examined the wreckage of the Kh-101 cruise missile. They found that its guidance systems contained a Japanese-made computer module, the export of which to Russia is officially prohibited.
This is not about direct deliveries from manufacturers to Russia, but about complex re-export schemes through third countries. The key role in the schemes is played by logistics companies that are officially engaged in international transportation.
One of them was the Japanese company Proco Air, which openly positions itself as a “bridge between Japan and Russia.” The company rents cargo seats from international airlines that fly to countries where Aeroflot still has access, in particular to Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan.
The cargo is then accepted by the Russian side. In itself, such a route is not illegal, since a significant amount of goods can still be legally exported to Russia.
However, Western intelligence agencies believe that these same logistics channels are also used to move dual-use goods that are subject to sanctions.
What do the company owners say?
The owner of Proco Air, Takehiko Miki, confirmed to journalists that he knew Maxim Filchenkov. At the same time, he categorically denied that he knew about his connections with Russian military intelligence.
The businessman also stated that his company transports only permitted goods, mainly medical equipment and cosmetics.
However, journalists drew attention to one of the transport documents, which Miki himself showed during an interview. Despite an attempt to hide the names of the companies, the document revealed that the final recipient was the Moscow company R-Pharm.
Its founder, Alexei Repik, is under sanctions by the UK, Canada and Australia due to his close ties to Vladimir Putin and support for the Russian military campaign. Japan did not impose sanctions on the R-Pharm company itself.
According to The New York Times, the Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly appealed to official Tokyo with evidence of the use of Japanese technologies by the Russian army. In April 2025 alone, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs received at least eight diplomatic notes with photographs and lists of components found in Russian missiles and drones.
Subsequently, approximately the same number of appeals were sent. The documents contained data on dozens of electronic components, printed circuit boards, transmitters and semiconductors of Japanese production.
At the same time, the Ukrainian side did not provide any evidence that Japanese companies knowingly sold products to Russia. It was precisely about further re-export through other states.
Among the manufacturers whose components were found in Russian weapons, NEC, Panasonic, Toshiba and other large Japanese corporations are named. They all told reporters that they strictly adhere to Japan’s sanctions regime and do not make prohibited deliveries to Russia.
NEC also noted that some of the components found have not been produced for many years.
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said that it regularly warns companies about the risks of circumventing sanctions and has already added dozens of foreign organizations suspected of helping Russia to the sanctions lists.
Why did Japan become a base for Russia?
Experts note that the problem is largely related to the peculiarities of Japanese legislation. After World War II, the country significantly limited the activities of its own special services.
Japan still does not have a separate foreign intelligence service, and the legislation on combating espionage is considered one of the mildest among developed countries. This is what, according to Western special services, Russia is actively using.
At the same time, the Japanese authorities have begun to gradually reform the national security system and strengthen counterintelligence capabilities in recent years.
In early 2026, Tokyo police reported the exposure of a Russian spy who, posing as a Ukrainian, tried to obtain commercial secrets of a Japanese company. However, the agent himself could not be detained – he left Japan before charges were brought.