The 2023 elections in Poland and Slovakia. Is there a threat to Ukraine’s support

In 2023-2025, Ukraine’s partner countries will hold parliamentary or presidential elections, on which the support of our state in the war with Russia depends. How the elections may affect Ukraine and where pro-Russian sentiment is growing, read in our material.

Why elections in Europe are important for Ukraine

Potential changes of power in partner countries should be taken into account when conducting strategic and defense planning in Ukraine and, of course, operational planning of the counter-offensive de-occupation operation.

All countries that are allies and partners of Ukraine are democracies with changing powers. Timing of change of power in European countries (as of 03.03.2023)

Parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Poland, Spain, UK, Germany and Italy and presidential elections in Moldova, Poland and France need the most attention of analysts in terms of securing the necessary support for Ukraine.

Despite the fact that all countries hold free and independent elections, it is impossible to analyze and forecast their possible political and military-political consequences without taking into account the influence on them, at least informationally, of the United States and Russia.

The US, Ukraine’s most powerful ally, will hold presidential elections on November 5, 2024.

There is some concern in Ukraine about a possible change of power in the US, especially after the controversial statements of former Republican President Trump and his son. At the same time, bipartisan support for Ukraine in the US is believed to be evident.

However, due to Trump’s growing influence on the Republican Party’s positions, this issue requires further research.

The Kremlin is already predicting Putin’s election victory

Russia’s presidential election is expected to take place on March 17, 2024. If no candidate wins a majority of votes in the first round, a runoff vote for the two candidates with the maximum number of votes will take place 21 days later.

Putin intends to participate in the next election. According to Article 81, paragraph 3 of the Russian Constitution, the same person cannot hold the office of president of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms. This means that Putin, who was elected president in 2012 and re-elected in 2018, will not be able to participate in this election. To get around this, it’s possible the election could be postponed, the Constitution could be changed, or Putin could take another position of power, as he did from 2008-2012, and run for president again in 2030 (at age 78).

Peskov, during another press briefing, called Russia’s elections “not exactly a democracy, but an expensive bureaucracy,” while he has already “predicted” Putin’s re-election with a result of 90% of the vote.

On the sidelines of the Kremlin “approved” Putin’s victory with 80% of the vote. The Kremlin’s main problem is the low turnout for the vote, which has a significant impact on the timing of general mobilization and the replenishment of human reserves for units and formations on the Russian-Ukrainian front.

Kremlin worries about public opinion on war against Ukraine

The Kremlin is also gradually beginning to worry about public opinion regarding the war. This is partly due to the upcoming elections.

Concerns in Putin’s entourage, in particular, could be seen against the backdrop of the adoption of the law on increasing the maximum age of conscription from 27 to 30. The controversial initiative of the Russian Defense Ministry was not unanimously supported.

In particular, the Russian Security Council urged the presidential administration not to support the changes due to concerns that they would cause a negative public reaction and affect Putin’s approval ratings ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

United Russia party officials are afraid to use the war against Ukraine in their campaigns for the upcoming regional and local elections (September 2023) because they are concerned about how voters will react.

Until about six months ago, Western experts believed that this was exactly what Putin’s party would emphasize by recruiting veterans of “special operations” to its ranks.

What to expect from the parliamentary elections in Poland

On October 15, 2023, Poland will hold regular parliamentary elections to elect the entire Sejm and Senate.

The parliamentary elections are the most important political event of 2023 in the Republic of Poland, and they have already plunged important ally Ukraine into a months-long period of turbulence.

How Polish elites handle it will determine the fate not only of that country, but of the entire Eastern European region.

Warsaw is a powerful sponsor of Ukraine in this difficult time at the political, military, financial and humanitarian levels and supports the people of Ukraine to the maximum extent possible.

Poland is almost the most important advocate of our state in Europe.

Warsaw is doing much to ensure that Kyiv receives defense assistance from its partners, and it is working hard to hold on to bipartisan support within the U.S. for Ukraine as well.

Today, the electoral flywheel, where the Ukrainian factor plays not the least role, is beginning to turn quickly. Poland is one of the most conservative countries in Europe.

The election results will determine whether the country becomes even more retrograde toward EU policies or, on the contrary, more pro-Western.

Who will compete in Poland’s parliamentary elections

As of today, the Law and Justice Party (PIS), which holds a majority in the Polish parliament, has more than 35% of the vote (polling company Kantar Public, and Gazeta Wyborcza).

The party is headed by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the twin brother of the party’s founder and 2005-2010 Polish President Lech Kaczynski, who was killed in a plane crash in Smolensk.

Poland’s main opposition force remains the Civic Platform (GP) party, led by the country’s former prime minister and ex-president of the European Council, Donald Tusk.

According to opinion polls, so far the GP has support of 30% and loses to PIS, and therefore Donald Tusk is actively looking for recipes for victory.

Significantly behind the leaders are the Confederation of Freedom and Independence (13.4%), the United Left (11.8%), Poland 2050 (8.9%).

The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) fails to pass the five percent barrier to parliament. Opposition parties plan to unite in the Sejm elections.

In this case, they will be able to bypass the PIS in the elections and form a majority in parliament.

All four opposition forces rule out a post-election coalition with PIS, which is explained by its authoritarian policy.

The leader of Platform has a clear position on Russian aggression against Ukraine. He expresses public support for our state.

Tusk calls for an immediate increase in arms deliveries, including heavy weapons, and political guarantees for Ukraine’s early full membership in the EU and NATO after the end of the war.

However, some statements by Platform representatives sound in unison with Russian propaganda.

Thus, in one interview, Radoslaw Sikorski, former Minister of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and current member of the European Parliament, when asked if he believed that “the PiS government thought for a moment about dividing Ukraine,” answered in the affirmative.

I think I had a moment of hesitation in the first 10 days of the war, when we all did not know how it would be, perhaps Ukraine would fall. And if not for Zelensky’s heroism and help from the West, everything could have been different,” Sikorski said.

At the same time, the politician accuses government officials of knowing about Russian aggression plans and meeting with pro-Russian radicals from all over Europe, particularly Viktor Orban and Marine Le Pen.

Kaczynski’s party and the opposition diverge on cooperation with EU countries.

The opposition is seen as more pro-Western and has plans to cooperate more closely with Germany and France.

Impact of the Polish elections on military support for Ukraine

Support for Ukraine is one of the few aspects of foreign policy that unites the views of the PIS and the opposition.

Despite the election of a new Sejm, Poland’s assistance to Ukraine is expected to be provided at all levels.

Poland realizes that its security will depend on the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The country borders Russia and Belarus.

Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has stated that Poland will continue to transfer MiG-29 airplanes, and in the future will probably be able to supply new types of U.S. weaponry, such as Abrams tanks.”

Despite strong support from most parties, the “Confederation of Freedom and Independence” is skeptical about helping Ukraine.

The Confederation is a Euroskeptic party that had somewhat pro-Russian views before the full-scale invasion.

Its representatives hint that the Polish authorities should first of all think about Polish citizens and only then help Ukraine.

The party notes that it is not necessary to be in the vanguard of supporting Ukraine because it poses a threat to Poland from Russia.

If the Confederation has influence over the future government, it could carry a threat to Ukraine’s interests.

Who will be the country’s next prime minister is not yet clear, but there are several likely candidates from the united opposition and the pro-government PIS party.

Law and Justice MPs unofficially report that the party will be looking for a new prime minister after the election.

The incumbent Prime Minister Morawiecki has generated a lot of negativity.

There are several candidates from PIS: former minister Beata Szydło and Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak and Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin.

The Civic Coalition may nominate two candidates for the seat – Donald Tusk and Warsaw city chairman Rafal Trzaskowski.

In Slovakia, populists will vie for power

“Slovak Trump” Robert Fico’s election campaign calls Ukrainians “fascists” and urges NATO to stop giving the “Kiev regime” weapons.

The country’s former prime minister, who is seeking to regain power in the upcoming parliamentary elections on Sept. 30, has placed billboards in Bratislava with overtly pro-Russian narratives.

Fico, who is often compared at home to former U.S. President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has been repeatedly marked by pro-Kremlin rhetoric and blamed Ukraine and the West for starting the war during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of a divided Slovak society, part of which supports democratic values and the country’s movement toward the West, and the other part supports right-wing authoritarian politicians like Fico, the election promises to be tense and full of mutual recriminations.

Despite Fico’s overtly populist rhetoric and the risks posed by his rise to power, analysts believe he has a chance to return to the prime minister’s chair for the third time in his career if he can secure the support of several smaller parties that will give him additional votes.

Fico has said that if he wins, he will not only stop armed aid to Ukraine, but, following Hungary’s example, he will demand that no aid to Kiev flow through Slovakia at all.

Slovakia is an important logistical hub for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the country repairs military equipment and produces, among other things, the Zuzana 2 SAU.

Slovakia is vulnerable to Russian propaganda

Slovakia is the most vulnerable state to Russian disinformation and propaganda among European countries.

There are 253 disinformation websites and more than 1,800 Facebook pages and open online groups with Kremlin propaganda in the Slovak segment of the Internet.

The Focus Agency for Markiza conducted a survey in January 2022 and found that 44% of Slovaks blamed NATO and the United States for the Russian-Ukrainian war. Russia was considered guilty by 35% of respondents.

After Russia’s full-scale aggression began, public opinion in Slovakia became more polarized. According to the Globsec Trends 2023 survey, 40% of Slovaks blame Russia, 34% blame the West, and 17% blame Ukraine.

Whether Slovaks will support pro-Russian parties in the elections

At the moment, the advantage of the pro-Russian party is tangible, but not critical – this means that the Smer-SD, even in case of victory, will not have the right to form a one-party government, and consequently will not have full power and will not make unanimous decisions.

In Slovakia, for example, a referendum by the pro-Russian opposition in favor of constitutional changes to make it easier to call early elections failed.

Although 98% voted in the affirmative, the vote was deemed invalid.

The democratic institutions themselves also act as a safeguard.

This was the case in Italy, where, after the Fratelli d’Italia party won the 2022 elections in coalition with the pro-Russian politician Silvio Berlusocchini’s political force, there were concerns about the durability of the course in support of Ukraine in repelling Russian aggression. The new Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni quickly made it clear that she would act solely in the interests of Italy and the civilized world, and even more so would not listen to representatives of the fifth column.

Can we expect something similar from Robert Fico, who has long been tainted by numerous scandals and openly playing on the side of Russia?

Doubtful, but there is still hope for the wisdom of other politicians and the strength of political institutions. This September becomes super important for Fico’s opponents – they must find arguments for voters and convince them not to vote for pro-Russian populists and Euroskeptics.

An example should be neighboring Hungary, which once made a mistake with Orban and now can’t get rid of this cancerous tumor.

Scandal before the elections in Slovakia

Elections-2023 will be very “dirty”. In fact, they have already become so. And, of course, not without Fico.

Now there is a new scandal in Slovakia – the Rozuzlenie case. Law enforcers have exposed a group of their colleagues headed by the head of the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), Michal Alac, who were supposed to clean up Mr. Fico’s “dirty laundry” from the times when he was in power.

This scandal has the potential to influence voters and play the role of a “black swan”.

Fico himself, in the best traditions of Trump, was quick to call everything a conspiracy against himself and a “police coup”, but the investigation is ongoing and the first “big heads” have already flown. Thus, President Chaputova temporarily suspended the head of the SIS Michal Alač.

In Slovakia, a criminal conspiracy involving intelligence and police was exposed. Finally, an important factor in the elections on September 30, 2023 may be the victories of the Ukrainian armed forces.

In 14 months, the Ukrainians, including through the powerful help of the Slovak authorities and its citizens showed that the Russian “king is naked”.

The success of the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine may lead to the fact that Robert Fico will have no masters and no goals in life.

What conclusions Ukrainians should draw

1. It should be clearly recognized that elections in some countries over the next two years are likely to change the West’s ability to support Ukraine, no matter how unwavering the West’s public statements and commitments are.
2. The success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the counter-offensive in the southern direction, the consolidation of the front line at the planned strategic line, and the confirmation of huge investments in Ukraine will be the strongest support for pro-Ukrainian forces in the upcoming elections.
3. In the near future (September, October 2023), parliamentary elections will be held in two countries that are strategically important for securing Ukraine’s victory – Poland and Slovakia. While in Poland the election results are quite predictable and probably will not have a significant impact on the level of support for Ukraine, the situation in Slovakia is worrying. The basis for this situation is, among other things, the traditional historical ties of the population of modern Slovakia with Russia (example: the division of Czechoslovakia into two states – pro-Western Czech Republic and pro-Russian Slovakia, with the subsequent rapid admission of the Czech Republic to NATO and the EU, which was a long and difficult path for Slovakia).
4. To ensure support for Ukraine in the conditions of democratic elections in the partner countries it is proposed: constant monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the development of domestic political life in the partner countries; carrying out activities to increase the capacity of Ukrainian information presence in the partner countries; expanding cooperation in the field of defense-industrial complex; clarifications and separate efforts aimed at solving problems of the historical plan.
5. Work with the Ukrainian diaspora in these countries, especially with citizens of these countries who already have appropriate citizenship and voting rights but remain ethnic Ukrainians, requires special attention, efforts and resources.